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CALIFORNIA ZAPPERS: A PROPOSAL FOR
CALIFORNIA’S COMMISSION ON THE 21ST CENTURY ECONOMY
Richard T. Ainsworth
On December 11, 2008 California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger and legislative
leaders announced appointments to the Commission on the 21st Century Economy. The mandate
is to propose ways to modernize the California revenue system by April 15, 2009. The Governor
is concerned with the “feast-or-famine” budget cycles, and Senate President pro Tempore Darrell
Steinberg emphasized that the Commission is expected to provide a, “… much needed outside
perspective on what exactly needs to be done to bring our tax system up to date.”
Assembly Speaker Karen Bass wants the Commission to provide a “…thorough review
of California's economic structure, to modernize and stabilize a system built for the 1930s,…”
but Senate Republican Leader Dave Cogdill expects “… revenue-neutral recommendations to
improve our broken budget system while ensuring our state remains competitive in a global
economy." Assembly Republican Leader Mike Villines anticipates, "… positive and lasting
changes … focusing on tax reforms that will encourage economic growth, job creation and
opportunity … not … higher taxes…”1
This is a classic tax reform effort. The Commission has a nearly impossible goal of
crafting a stabilizing, revenue neutral tax reform that will modernize the tax system, provide jobs
and growth but not raise taxes. Not many suggestions will meet all of these requirements, but
this proposal might.
This paper suggests that the Commission on the 21st Century Economy look carefully at
one aspect of digital tax fraud – automated sales suppression, or digital skimming of cash sales
with modern electronic cash registers (ECRs). This proposal considers the California tax system
from the outside – it adopts a comparative international perspective. Recognizing that the 21st
Century economy is digital at its core, foreign governments have observed that fraudsters have
automated many traditional tax evasion methods including cash skimming operations. These
new ways of performing old frauds have made frauds difficult to detect without the assistance of
technology-sensitive legislation (and regulation) as well as technology-intensive audit tools. In
short, from a foreign perspective it appears that California might find that a digital hole has been
cut through the bottom of the modern ECR and significant sales tax receipts, taxable business
profits, and personal income are falling through. Foreign revenue authorities are making efforts
to plug this hole, as of yet California has not done so.
Specifically, this proposal asks the Commission to recommend that a randomized,
statistically valid study be taken of automated sales suppression within the State. The study
should consider add-on software (zappers), factory or distributor installed software
(phantomware), and manually re-programmed ECRs (self-help phantomware). The Commission
should further recommend that if the results of this study align with the results of similar
1

Office of the Governor, Press Release, Gov. Schwarzenegger and Legislative Leaders Announce Appointments to
Bipartisan Commission on the 21st Century Economy (Dec. 11, 2008) GAAS:826:08 available at
http://gov.ca.gov/index.php?/press-release/11233/ (last visited Dec. 16, 2008).
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(foreign) studies then appropriate legislative (or regulatory) changes should be enacted to meet
this challenge. A technology-intensive audit response will most likely (but not necessarily) also
be required.
It should be emphasized that as of this writing, California has not uncovered a single
instance of technology-assisted skimming. After considering the foreign evidence the
Commission should ask – is this absence because Californians are not skimming cash sales with
technology, or is this absence because the California skimming technology works so well that the
fraud is not being detected? If the later is the case, then time may be of the essence. Considered
from a global perspective, it is reasonably clear that we are moving into a fourth generation of
automated sales suppression, and with each generation the fraudsters are becoming more difficult
to uncover.2 One of the reasons this problem has not been better addressed may be because
almost all of the work in this area is being done in foreign languages – French, German,
Portuguese, Dutch and Swedish.
SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM - STUDIES
The leading government studies of automated sales suppression are from Quebec and
Germany. The UK is in the process of completing a national study and results are expected in
2009. The German and Quebec studies both underpinned the need for significant legislative
reforms. Neither government has made the full studies available to the public, but a governmentto-government exchange could be arranged. Summaries have been released, and they arrive at
similar conclusions.
Quebec. The government of Quebec conducted two studies focused on the restaurant
sector. The first study gathered its subjects from the customer list of a known
distributor/developer of automated sales suppression software. This investigation (the First
Inspection Wave) examined 70 systems and uncovered 41 zappers.3 A more statistically
accurate investigation followed (the Second Inspection Wave). It was based on a random sample
of businesses within the restaurant and hospitality industry. This survey, conducted by Finances
Quebec, found that 16% of all sales went unreported.4
Both of these studies were relied upon by the Quebec Minister of Revenue, Jean-Marc
Fournier, when he announced legislative changes, enhanced enforcement efforts, and a pilot
project designed to counter the penetration of sales suppression technology in the restaurant
sector on January 28, 2008. He indicated:
Although the majority of restaurant owners comply with their tax obligations, the
restaurant sector remains an area of the Quebec economy where tax evasion is
rampant, both in terms of income taxes and sales taxes. Tax losses in this sector

2

For a discussion of the fourth generation of sales suppression software, a problem that Sweden seems to be dealing
with currently see: Richard Thompson Ainsworth, Zappers and Phantomware: Are State Tax Administrators
Listening Now?, 49 STN 103 (July 14, 2008).
3
Dave Bergeron & Richard Ainsworth, Zappers (Automated Sales Suppression) 12, powerpoint presentation at the
New York Prosecutors Training Institute (Syracuse, NY) July 31, 2008 (on file with author).
4
Id. at 13 (but noting further that the 16% figure measures all skimming frauds, not just skimming with Zappers).
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are significant. Revenue Quebec estimates them at $425 million for the 20072008 fiscal year.5
Other things being equal,6 because the California economy is roughly 61% larger than the
Quebec economy, a similar study in the California restaurant sector might find tax losses to be in
the $700 million range.7 Although restaurants are a popular area for sales suppression (because
they have a high concentration of cash sales) it is clear from Dutch and Brazilian investigations
that grocery and convenience stores, hairdressers and butcher shops also have very high
concentrations of automated sales suppression.
Germany. The Interim Report of the German Working Group on Cash Registers
indicates that the Group was “… aware of [technology-assisted] fraud amounting to 50% of
companies cash receipts.”8 The Working Group does not separately quantify the kinds of
technology-assisted fraud involved.
The Working Group’s 50% observation is supported by a report made by the German
Federal Audit Office (BHR) to the German Parliament in 2003. In this report the BHR appears
to focus only on factory installed software.9 The BHR concludes that the potential loss in
Germany is in the billions of euros:
The Federal Audit Office (BHR) has complained that later models of electronic
cash registers and cash management systems now fail to meet the principles of
correct accounting practice when it comes to recording transactions … The risk of
tax fraud running into many billions [of euro] should not be underestimated in
cash transactions.10
Both the BHR’s observations and the Working Group’s study are further buttressed by
summaries from studies conducted by three German federal states. These studies are limited,

5

Revenue Quebec, Press Release, Jean-Marc Fornier, Pour plus d'équité dans la restauration : il faut que ça se
passe au-dessus de la table; (English trans. For more equity in the restaurant sector it is required that [business is
conducted] above the table ) available at :
http://www.revenu.gouv.qc.ca/eng/ministere/centre_information/communiques/autres/2008/28jan.asp (last visited
August 7, 2008). See also the accompanying powerpoint presentation, Facturation obligatoire dans le secteur de la
restauration, L’évasion fiscale au Québec, Sous-déclaration des revenus dans le secteur de la restauration;
(English Trans. Tax Evasion in Quebec : Obligatory Billing in the Restaurant Sector – Under-declaration of
revenues in the restaurant sector) 3 (January 28, 2008) (in French) (on file with author, with translation).
6
Of course things are not equal. Take for example the tax rates: California’s combined state and local consumption
tax rate is 7.25% whereas Quebec’s is 7.5% (Quebec includes the federal GST in the rate base of the QST).
7
Quebec’s 2007 GDP was $992,850 million (expressed in 2002 dollars); California’s 2005 GDP was $1,622,116
million (revised October 26, 2006). Thus, 992,850/1,622,116 = 61%; 61% x 425 = 259; 425 + 259 = 684. Board of
Trade of Montreal, Composition of Quebec’s GDP, (updated July 3, 2008) available at
http://tableaudebordmontreal.com/indicateurs/activiteeconomique/compositionpib/compositionpibqc.en.html?mode
=print (last visited Dec. 17, 2008); California Department of Finance, Economic Research, California Statistical
Abstract, Table D-1: Gross State Product [source: US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis]
available at http://www.dof.ca.gov/html/fs_data/stat-abs/toc.htm
8
Working Group on Cash Registers: Interim Report 5 (Mar. 16, 2005) (Ger.) (translation on file with author).
9
Id. at 5 (listing the following attributes: (1) erasing all data entries, (2) resetting the zero counter, (3) unwarranted
counter-entries, (4) unwarranted use of the training mode, and (5) suppressing the grand total memory).
10
BRH comments 2003, No 54, Federal Parliament circular 15/2020 at 197-198 (Nov. 24, 2003) (in German)
(original and translation on file with author).
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because they focus only on the restaurant sector. But, they too conclude that sales suppression is
a significant problem:
One federal state is currently implementing a special “restaurant” initiative.
Checks already made have led to average upward revisions of 46% of original
turnover. A comparable initiative in another federal state resulted in over half the
cases (54%) having upward revisions of 60% of declared turnover. Fraud
amounting to 25% was detected in a fifth of the cases, and was as high as 5% in
the remaining 26% of cases. A third federal state has found that around 45% of
till receipts involving cash are subject to upward revisions ranging from 20% to
118%.11
ZAPPERS AND PHANTOMWARE
Skimming cash receipts is an old fashioned tax fraud; a fraud traditionally associated
with small or medium sized enterprises. Large businesses with formalized internal control
mechanisms, external accountants, and professional management structures do not normally
engage in skimming,12 although personal conversations with auditors from Revenue Quebec
indicate that this may not be a solid assumption any more. Businesses that skim frequently keep
two sets of books (one for the tax man, the other for the owner). In its simplest (nontechnological) form there are two tills, and the cashier simply diverts some cash from selected
sales into a secret drawer. A record of the diversion may be maintained, but it will be kept
outside the formal accounting system. Businesses that skim rarely do so with credit card
transactions precisely because these sales can be documented externally through the banking
system. Skimming frauds thrive when the owner (or a close family member) is the cashier.13
Technology is changing how businesses skim. The agents of change are software
applications – phantom-ware and zappers. Phantom-ware is a “hidden,” pre-installed
programming option(s) embedded within the operating system of a modern electronic cash
register (ECR). It can be used to create a virtual second till and may preserve a digital (off-line)
record of the skimming (a second set of digital books). The physical diversion of funds into a
second drawer is no longer required, and the need for manual recordkeeping of the skim is
eliminated. Because phantom-ware programming is part of the operating system of an ECR its
use can be detected with the assistance of a computer audit specialist.
Zappers are more advanced technology than phantom-ware. Zappers are special
programming options added to ECRs or point of sale (POS) networks. They are carried on
memory sticks, removable CDs or can be accessed through an internet link. Because zappers are
not integrated into operating systems their use is more difficult to detect. Zappers liberate
11

Id. at 5.
EU Commission, Fiscalis Committee Project Group 12, Cash Register Project Group, Cash Register Good
Practice Guide, ¶ 2.5 (Dec. 2006) (on file with author).
13
See for example the use of double tills to manually skim cash receipts in the UK at Aleef Garage Ltd. This was a
£5.3 million tax fraud, and according to Steve Armitt, Group Leader HMRC Criminal Investigations indicated, “…
the investigation was made all the more difficult because of the closed ranks of the employees involved some of
whom were close family members … [t]hose involved tried to make it as difficult as possible for the cheating to be
discovered.” HMRC News Release, Company Directors Jailed for £5million Fraud 1 (Nov. 13, 2007) available at
https://www.gnn.gov.uk/content/detail.asp?NewsAreaID=2&ReleaseID=330199 (last visited Aug. 8, 2008)
12

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1324812

owners from the need to personally operate the cash register. Remote skimming of cash
transactions is now possible without the knowing participation of the cashier who physically
rings up the sale. This attribute of zappers allows the incidence of skimming fraud to migrate
beyond the traditional “mom and pop” stores. Zappers allow owners to place employees at the
cash register, check their performance (monitor employee theft), but then remotely skim sales to
cheat the taxman.
While California has uncovered no zappers or phantomware applications, the Province of
Quebec (alone) has brought 230 cases to court.14 In the early days Quebec was concerned that
the software that facilitated this fraud was US made and was sold over the internet for $500.15
Canadian subsidiaries of US companies were early providers.16 Soon however, the design and
installation of this software became a “cottage industry” for local IT professionals.17
14

Roy Furchgott, With Software, Till Tampering Is Hard To Find, NYT C6 (August 20, 2008) indicating:
[T]he Canadian province of Quebec may be the world leader in prosecuting zapper cases. Since
1997, zappers have figured in more than 230 investigations, according to the tax collecting body
Revenue Québec, which has found an active market for the software. In making 713 searches of
merchants, Revenue Québec found 31 zapper programs that worked on 13 cash register systems.
Available at:
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/30/technology/30zapper.html?scp=1&sq=With%20Software,%20Till%20Tamperi
ng%20Is%20Hard%20to%20Find%20%20comments&st=cse
15
Craig Silverman, Zapped!, HOUR (Feb. 19, 2004) available at:
http://www.hour.ca/news/brief.aspx?iIDArticle=783 (last visited Feb. 15, 2008).
16
Turcotte v Quebec (Ministry of Revenue) 1998 CarswellQue 1041, [1998] R.D.F.Q. 110 Superior Court of
Quebec. This case involved the MRQ investigation of Gamma Terminal, Inc., a wholly owned Canadian subsidiary
of an American company, Gamma Micro Systems. This investigation began in 1997 and focused on the distribution
of the Gamma Restaurant Management System. It eventually lead to a number of conviction of restaurants that used
this system to delete sales records, including the companies 136530 Canada, Inc. and San Antonio’s Grill. Revenue
Quebec, Press Release, Deux sociétés coupables d'avoir utilisé un camoufleur de ventes dans des restaurants de
Laval et de Repentigny (English Trans. Two companies guilty of having used a camoufleur sales in restaurants in
Laval and Repentigny) April 25, 2005 available at
http://www.revenu.gouv.qc.ca/eng/ministere/centre_information/communiques/ev-fisc/2005/25avril.asp (in French,
translation on file with author) last visited August 6, 2008.
17
Consider for example the cases of (1) Audio Lab LP; (2) Michael Roy; or that of (2) Luc Primeau.
Audio Lab LP: On April 8, 2004 Revenue Quebec announced that it executed four search warrants on the
numbered company 9061-1184 Quebec Inc. which operated a restaurant under the name San Antonio Grill in Laval,
Quebec. The allegation was that a “sales Zapper” (camoufleur de ventes) was used delete sales records. The
Zapper was on a diskette used in connection with the restaurant’s computer system. Revenue Quebec, News
Release, Le ministère du Revenu soupçonne le restaurant Grill San Antonio de Laval d'avoir utilisé un zapper (Eng.
Trans.Tax Evasion: The Ministry of Revenue Suspects the Restaurant Grill San Antonio de Laval of having used a
Zapper) (Apr. 8, 2004) available at:
http://www.revenu.gouv.qc.ca/eng/ministere/centre_information/communiques/ev-fisc/2004/08avril.asp (in French
only, last visited Dec. 18, 2008). Next year, on April 25, 2005, Revenue Quebec announced that the director of San
Antonio Grill pleaded guilty to using a Zapper. (The director, Mr. Apostolos Mandaltsis, was personally fined.) A
related company of similar name, Grill San Antonio in Repentigny, also pleaded guilty to similar offences. Revenue
Quebec, News Release, Deux sociétés coupables d'avoir utilisé un camoufleur de ventes dans des restaurants de
Laval et de Repentigny (Eng. Trans. Two Companies Guilty of having used Zappers in Restaurants in Laval and
Repentigny), available at: http://www.revenu.gouv.qc.ca/eng/ministere/centre_information/communiques/evfisc/2005/25avril.asp (in French only, last visited Dec. 18, 2008). Later that year, on October 1, 2005, Revenue
Quebec announced that it executed five more search warrants in Montreal and Laval with respect to Audio Lab LP,
Inc. It was under suspicion of having developed and marketing a sales Zapper, software that was compatible with its
own restaurant cash register software, Softdine. Revenue Quebec, News Release, Revenu Québec enquête sur un
concepteur de logiciel de point de vente soupçonné d'avoir conçu et distribué un camoufleur de ventes (Eng. Trans.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1324812

Revenue Quebec Investigation of a Software Designer Outlet Suspected of having Developed and Distributed
Zappers (Oct. 14, 2005) available at:
http://www.revenu.gouv.qc.ca/eng/ministere/centre_information/communiques/ev-fisc/2005/14oct(2).asp (in French
only, last visited Dec. 18, 2008). Softdine was the operating software in the cash registers at San Antonio’s Grill in
Laval, and at Grill San Antonio in Repentigny. On June 26, 2007 Audio Lab LP, Inc. pleaded guilty to charges of
having, “… designed and marketed a computer program designed to alter, amend, delete, cancel or otherwise alter
accounting data in sales records kept by means of a software that [Audio Lab LP] had designed and marketed.” In
other words, it pleaded guilty to developing a Zapper to “add-on” to its own commercial software (Softdine) that it
provided to restaurants for use in their POS systems. Press reports directly link this conviction to the investigation
begun at Grill San Antonio in Laval in 2004. Revenue Quebec, News Release, La société Audio L.P. inc.
condamnée pour fraude fiscale (Eng. Trans. The Company Audio LP, Inc. Convicted of Tax Evasion) (Sept. 21,
2007) available at: http://www.revenu.gouv.qc.ca/eng/ministere/centre_information/communiques/evfisc/2007/21sep.asp (in French only, last visited Dec. 18, 2008).
Michael Roy: Before the first warrants were issued in Audio Lab LP Revenue Quebec had successfully
brought to conclusion an extensive investigation of twenty-eight restaurants doing business under the name Stratos.
Each of the restaurants in the Stratos chain used Zappers. To dispose of the excess cash from skimmed sales (1) a
double billing system was put in place with suppliers (to conceal purchases made in cash), and (2) wages were paid
to employees in cash (without being reported as income). The guilty pleas from this investigation came in waves –
nineteen companies pleading guilty on September 26, 2002; another six pleading guilty on October 11, 2002, and
the four remaining pleading guilty on March 21, 2003. Press releases provide details of only the final ten companies.
In aggregate the taxes and penalties for these companies came to $1,816,070.90, but the real thrust of the news
releases were that “… the Department has conducted searches in order to establish proof that the designer of the IT
function associated with the cash register software Terminal Resto had participated in the scheme set up by
restaurants in the Stratos chain.” The breakdown is: $429,179.07 (GST) + $492,023.11 (PST) + $214,589.55
(federal penalties) + $625,028.89 (provincial penalties) + $55,250.28 (judicial fees). Revenue Quebec, News
Release, Tous les restaurants Stratos coupables de fraude fiscale en lien avec l'utilisation du zapper (Eng. Trans. All
Stratos Restaurants Convicted of Fraud in Connection with the use of a Zapper (Mar. 18, 2003) available at:
http://www.revenu.gouv.qc.ca/eng/ministere/centre_information/communiques/ev-fisc/2003/18mars.asp (in French
only, last visited Dec. 18, 2008). That proof was forthcoming on April 25, 2003, when Mr. Michel Roy and his two
sons Danny and Miguel were convicted of tax evasion. The father (Michel) was the creator of the Zapper that
worked with Resto Terminal. He promoted it and made the sales. His sons (Miguel and Danny) installed the
software and designed the civil fraud. Aggregate fraud penalties assessed against the Roys were $1,064,459.
Revenue Quebec, News Release, Des amendes de plus de un million de dollars - Un père et ses deux fils condamnés
pour fraude fiscale en lien avec le zapper (Eng. Trans. Fines of more than One million dollars – A Father and his
Two Sons convicted for Tax Evasion in connection with the Zapper (May 2, 2003) available at:
http://www.revenu.gouv.qc.ca/eng/ministere/centre_information/communiques/ev-fisc/2003/02mai.asp (in French
only, last visited Dec. 18, 2008).
Luc Primeau: Revenue Quebec announced on March 17, 2003 that seven Patio Vidal restaurant
franchises and a bar, La Tasca, from Gatineau, Quebec as well as another bar named O’Max in Masson-Angers,
Quebec were convicted of adding Zappers to their Microflash cash register software (later upgraded to a new version
called Caracara). Even though guilty pleas were entered on March 14, 2003, a search warrant had already been
executed the previous December against the designer of Microflash and Caracara, because the software developer
was suspected of also being the developer of the associated Zapper program. Revenue Quebec, News Release, M.
Marcel St-Louis de l'Outaouais coupable de fraude fiscale liée à l'utilisation d'un zapper (Eng. Trans. Mr. Marcel
St. Louis de l’Outaouais Convicted of Tax Evasion related to the use of a Zapper) (Mar. 17, 2003) available at:
http://www.revenu.gouv.qc.ca/eng/ministere/centre_information/communiques/ev-fisc/2003/17mars.asp (in French
only, last visited Dec. 18, 2008). On October 17, 2005 Luc Primeau admitted using his software to assist these
companies to evade $435,000 in GST and QST. They skimming $2.7 million is cash sales. Mr. Primeau was fined
$20,000 for his involvement. However, Mr. Primeau was more than a Zapper salesman, he considered himself a
provider of management services (admittedly focused on how to “manage Zappers”) for which he also charged a
fee. Revenue Quebec determined that not only did Mr. Primeau fail to report GST and QST of $33,725.45 on his
own sales (of Zappers), but he also failed to report income of $155,084.99 in services income Zapper management
advice). Revenue Quebec, News Release, Le concepteur d'un camoufleur de ventes de Boucherville plaide coupable
à diverses accusations portées par le fisc québécois (Eng. Trans. The Zapper Designer of Boucherville Pleads
Guilty to Various Charges brought by Inland Revenue Quebec (Oct. 26, 2005) available at:
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FOUR GENERATIONS OF AUTOMATED SALES SUPPRESSTION TECHNOLOGY
In general we are considering software programs that are used in conjunction with ECRs
or point of sale (POS) systems to alter business records, allowing owners to skim cash receipts.
The term automated sale suppression device18 is a general classification for all software
programs used or designed to facilitate cash skimming. Phantom-ware is a sub-classification. It
includes the first two generations of automated sales suppression devices – self-help phantomware, and factory (or distributor) installed phantom-ware. Zappers are a third generation of
automated sales suppression devices. A fourth generation of this software appears to be under
development now, a foreign (or extra-jurisdictional) zapper that is provided to users over the
internet, which alters domestic records from a distance, and removes both the program and the
developer from the immediate grasp of the local tax authorities.
Phantom-ware.19 Phantom-ware is programming placed within a modern ECR or POS
system that can be used to hide the skimming of cash sales. Phantom-ware is “hidden” (in the
sense of not being disclosed in user manuals). Its use, operation, and even its existence may be
very difficult to detect on audit.
Phantom-ware re-programs an ECR or POS system so that selected types of cash sales
are not recorded (receipts can be renumbered to follow a new sequence, Z Reports and X Reports
can be altered, and the Electronic Journal can be brought into conformity with all other changes).
This programming exists on most systems for good (but not often needed) business purposes,
and for which there are good reasons for having it “hidden” from employees. For example
during a bankruptcy sell-off of business assets a buyer of the ECR would want to clear the

http://www.revenu.gouv.qc.ca/eng/ministere/centre_information/communiques/ev-fisc/2005/26oct.asp (in French
only, last visited Dec. 18, 2008). The real reason Mr. Primeau did not report this income probably [no one really
knows] had to do with the fact that he was being paid out of the $2.7 million in skimmed cash sales from the nine
companies where he sold, installed and managed his Zappers. These funds probably needed to be kept “hidden” (to
facilitate the overall success of the fraud), and in a sense represented his “share” of the skimmed profits.
18
“Automated sales suppression,” “electronic sales suppression,” or “sales suppression technologies” is the
preferred expression of the Canadian Revenue Authority (CRA) these days. For example, at the 2007 International
Tax Dialogue Conference the Director General SME Directorate, Compliance Program Branch indicated:
One of the most popular means to suppress sales is to utilize electronic suppression of sales
technologies, such as “Zapper.” The CRA is actively working with provincial counterparts
(through the FPTUEWG – Federal/Provincial Meeting of the Underground Economy Working
Group ) to address Zapper and other point-of-sales suppression technologies.
Jim Gauvreau, SME Audit and Verification Strategies and Techniques Based on Risk Detection and Risk Selection,
ITD Global Conference on Taxation of Small and Medium Enterprises 14 (parallel session 4, stream B) (Buenos
Aires, Argentina)(Oct. 17-19, 2007) available at:
http://www.itdweb.org/SMEconference/documents/parallel/4B%20GAUVREAU%20CANADA.pdf
A similar expression, “fraudulent risk software” is used in many EU documents. For example, the Cash
Register Good Practice Guide dedicates Appendix F to “Fraudulent Risk Software.” This Guide identifies forty-two
different “risks” in Appendix B, assimilating everything from self-help phantom-ware through zappers and more
within this expression. See, Fiscalis Committee Project Group 12, Cash Register Project Group, Cash Register
Good Practice Guide, Appendix B & F(Dec. 2006) (on file with author).
19
The term “phantom-ware” originates with this author, who after struggling with imprecise and overlapping
terminology employed elsewhere, decided that a new expression was needed.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1324812

electronic journal. Programming is needed to do this, but one might not want the night shift
manager to know how to do this with instructions set out in the user’s manual.20
Because it relies on a manual re-programming of systems this is called self-help
phantom-ware. Installers, distributors and manufacturers frequently provide help-desk support
and will guide owners in the use of these “hidden” functions. Help-desk personnel may suspect,
but have no reason to definitively know that a user is asking for help to commit fraud. The
critical problem with these functions is that the ECR is commonly programmed (in addition) to
not preserve a record of the re-programming action. There is a real danger to the fraudster if
records are preserved. Government auditors might suspect fraud in a business that repeatedly
programmed and re-programmed its ECRs to start and stop Z or X Report, or entries in the
Electronic Journal.
When manufacturers or software providers take the next step and automate the reprogramming of self-help phantom-ware (to reduce the likelihood of user re-programming
errors) the risk that the manufacturer/software provider will be pulled into a criminal tax fraud
audit is elevated. This is factory-installed (or distributor-installed) phantom-ware. It is the next
generation of this software, and it presents a different constellation of legal and audit issues.
In this new generation the technology has changed.21 The new technology only has one
purpose – fraud. It is still phantom-ware – programming hidden in the software – but it requires
very little operator-intervention to use. It can be identified by tax auditors only if the operating
system of the ECR or POS system is broken down.
Zappers.22 Zappers are not embedded in operating programs of ECRs or POS systems;
they are add-on programs that are removed as easily as they are added to a system. Zappers can
20

See, IRS, Ex-Burger King Manager Sentenced in IRS Fraud Case for Skimming $180,000 in Cash (relating the
manual skimming fraud orchestrated by the night manager of a chain of Burger King restaurants that involved
simply not ringing sales through the register, or voiding sales made, a fraud which would have been more easily
carried out with technology but the user manual did not contain instructions for the night manager to perform the
fraud in this way) available at: http://www.irs.gov/compliance/enforcement/article/0,,id=163019,00.html
21
The Cash Register Good Practice Guide notes at ¶ 4.1:
In countries that have no legislative requirement to use Fiscal Tills, tax auditors are now
encountering increasingly sophisticated electronic till systems that present potentially enormous
risks.
These till systems are extremely vulnerable to all three risk types identified. In particular,
new tills systems are being manufactured with “fraudulent risk” software installed as standard.
22
“Zapper” is the term originally used “on the street” (in Quebec) to describe an automated sales suppression device.
In the early days, a “Sales Zapper” was a specific commercially available product purchased (frequently over the
internet for about $500.00). This product was identified by name in several investigative reports in the Canadian
press in 1997, and was adopted by MRQ to describe all devices in this field.
When researching in French sources the expression used for the English word “zapper” is camoufleur de
ventes. For example, Revenue Quebec describes the recent investigation into the activities of Logicaisse Ltd. As
follows (emphasis added):
Revenu Québec a des motifs raisonnables de croire que cette société a conçu et distribué un
camoufleur de ventes (communément appelé zapper), utilisé avec le logiciel RMS-Touch, dont
elle est le distributeur exclusif au Québec, et qu'elle a permis à différentes sociétés, principalement
des restaurants, de se servir de ce camoufleur pour dissimuler des ventes afin d'éluder le paiement
des taxes et des impôts.
Which translates as:
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be physically hidden during an audit. Zappers, like factory-installed phantom-ware, have no
purpose other than to facilitate skimming by reconstructing (deleting, replacing or
supplementing) ECR or POS system records.
Zappers are contained on CDs or memory sticks. Without a disclosure by the fraudster
(or the distributor, or the zapper-developer) the use of a zapper is nearly impossible to detect.
Traces of zapper use however, can be found when fraudsters are not careful, or if the zapper is
not well designed. Occasionally back-up records remain in a POS system or an ECR that
reference the original transaction data. For this reason, technical support is frequently needed

Revenue Quebec has reasonable grounds to believe that this company has designed and distributed
a camoufleur sales (commonly called zapper), the software used with RMS-Touch, which it is
the exclusive distributor in Quebec, and has enabled different companies, mainly restaurants, use
this camoufleur to conceal sales to evade payment of taxes.
Revenue Quebec, Press Release, Les systèmes informatiques Logicaisse ltée dans la mire de Revenu Québec (Eng.
trans. Computer systems Ltd. Logicaisse in the grasp of Revenue Quebec) (Mar. 12, 2008) available at:
http://www.revenu.gouv.qc.ca/eng/ministere/centre_information/communiques/ev-fisc/2008/12mars.asp (in French
only, last visited Dec. 18, 2008).
As late as April 25, 2001 the CRA was following MRQ usage. This was the expression used by Kevin
Pratt at the FTA meetings in Louisville, Kentucky in February 2001 and was the expression used by Mr. Pinternal in
a memorandum from Regional Attorneys Serge Clairoux and Jean Marois to Jean-Francois Normand at the Head
Quarters for the Underground Economy. Here the CRA refers to a “Zapper Initiative,” and indicates that CRA
wanted to “take the lead” on this issue. However, this memo and others also concede that in fact the CRA was
instead following the well marked path of the MRQ :
History
In December 1997, Radio Canada current affairs program “Le Point” ran a story about
the use of Zappers. The week after, a meeting was held involving UE [Underground Economy],
Investigations from HQ, Montreal and Ontario and Quebec provincial officers. As conclusion, it
has been decided that HQ-UE should take the lead of this issue. A series of recommendations
were also provided to Mr. Lacombe, former ADM. [The recommendations have been redacted.]
Until now, the MRQ [Ministry of Revenue Quebec] has proceeded to complete several
audits, Investigations and searches related to Zapper users. On May 12th, we received a press
release from MRQ about the Nickles group who plead guilty to 74 charges of tax evasion. [The
enclosed copy of the guilty plea has been redacted.] …
Definition
Zapper software programs are electronic means of concealing revenues. Taxpayers can
delete 5, 10, 15 percent or more of their sales by activating an accounting software program. In
order to eliminate as many trails as possible, Zappers are used mainly in cash transactions.
Memo obtained through a Request for Information pursuant to the Access to Information Act, R.S.C. (1985)(Can.)
(on file with author).
“Zapper” is also the expression used in early OECD documents to describe the whole field of automated
sales suppression devices (admittedly in the very last paragraph on the very last page of an e-commerce report):
However, an intimate knowledge of how to manipulate computer systems is not required where
unscrupulous software programs, such as “zapper” are developed. These programs are specifically
designed to falsify records and hide certain transactions. News of these techniques generally
spreads rapidly through an industry, especially traditional cash based industries. Tax authorities
will have to be attuned to new tools to defeat the integrity of systems much as they must keep
abreast of new tax dodges and schemes for illegally sheltering income. Tax authorities must also
make sure that they have audit experts that are experienced in online business methods and
models. They must catalogue and understand the digital footprints that electronic records leave
and develop compliance models for online business types that provide a basis for comparison
across tax paying entities.
OECD, REPORT BY THE TECHNOLOGY TECHNICAL ADVISORY GROUP (TAG) (Dec. 2000) 93.
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when zappers are used, just as they are with phantom-ware applications – something that leads to
long-term business-fraud relationships.
Although things have already developed beyond this point, it is common to find
government reports that set out these three phases in automated sales suppression fraud in
contrast to the manual skimming techniques of the past. Consider this assessment in the Interim
Report of the German Working Group on Cash Registers23 where the terminology used in this
paper has been added in bold brackets:
The fraud is perpetrated in different ways. One way is for taxable persons
to totally fail to record some of their cash receipts. [Manual skimming] Another
is for them to exploit the numerous tampering possibilities available through their
electronic or computerised tills. [Self-help Phantom-ware]
This is done by using the extensive programming options described in the
till manual. As a result, information which has initially been entered correctly is
falsified when stored and released. Till manufacturers confirm that customers
enquire about such functions, and that they influence customer purchasing
decisions. [Factory-installed Phantom-ware] What is more, special types of
programmes are known to offer additional functions which are specifically
designed to facilitate the doctoring of information. The programmes are created
by external software manufacturers, rather than by till manufacturers. [Zappers]
International zappers. As revenue authorities began to identify phantom-ware
applications, domestic developers responded with zappers that could be removed and hidden
when an audit commenced. If a zapper is uncovered the auditors today have become very adept
in finding the developer, his customer list, and then following up with audits on each of the
developer’s clients.
It has not been lost on the developers of automated sales suppression devices that the
Quebec Ministry of Revenue (MRQ) was able to find zappers in seven Patio Vidal restaurant
franchises, and two bars (La Tasca in Gatineau, and O’Max in Masson-Angers) by following the
customer list of Luc Primeau.24 Because Mr. Primeau was a local developer he increased the
risk of detection for all his clients.25 Similarly, when the Belastingdiest (Dutch IRS) was able to
identify a locally designed zapper (used on produce scales in grocery stores to alter the data feed
from the scales to the ECR) it was able to trace this zapper through approximately 1,200
businesses by simply following the customer lists of the local developer.26
An on-going Swedish investigation27 (scheduled for trial late in 2008, now delayed until
2009) involves an ECR manufactured from Paris, France (TT PI Electronique) which is popular
in Italy, Belgium, Portugal, Spain, Germany, Denmark, Australia, the US and North Africa. The
23

Working Group on Cash Registers: Interim Report 5 (Mar. 16, 2005) (Ger.) (translation on file with author).
See supra note 17.
25
See supra note 17.
26
LJN: AT 5876, District Court of Arnhem (Jul. 27, 2005) (in Dutch) (translation on file with author); Joan van den
Dungen, Software Company Confesses Shop Scales Fraud – Managing Director of Software Company Confesses
Shop Scales Fraud, TELEGRAAF (Feb. 7, 2003) (in Dutch) (translation of file with author).
27
Martin Jansson, Fraud by Using a Cash Register and Back-Office System, (undated, unpublished paper) (on file
with author).
24
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operating system used in the specific TT PI Electronique ECRs under investigation includes a
back-office program called Restodata.
The Restodata program is licensed and comes with a grey program dongle28 on a memory
stick. Directly attached to this dongle is a second (silver) memory stick that contains a zapper.
The zapper used in this system has the ability to either (a) selectively change line items on a sales
ticket (replacing expensive items with less expensive items and reducing the related VAT
charges) or (b) perform a fully automated “zapping” of all transactions so that total sales for a
day would be reduced by a specified amount. As a result, this zapper allows a fraudster to
custom tailor his zapping. However, one of the most distressing aspects of this case is the
following comment by Martin Jansson, the Swedish auditor who found this zapper:
In this case the restaurant under investigation used a backoffice program called
Restodata. According to the exe-file the program was produced by a company
called “Restodata Inc.” However, we haven’t been able to find that name
anywhere.29
The Swedish case is an excellent example of where zapper technology is headed.
Zappers are being internationalized. In fact, if one examines the TT PI Electronique system with
the zapper installed it is easy to see the system move from a Swedish interface to an English
interface as the zapper is inserted into the POS system. Although not conclusive by any means,
it does seem to suggest that the Swedish Tax Administration is up against a zapper that is a bit
more difficult to trace than those found by the MRQ. The Swedish Tax Administration is most
likely not looking at an in-house zapper, nor is it looking at a locally designed and distributed
zapper. It is looking at a foreign zapper designed to facilitate local fraud.30
28

A dongle is a small hardware key that plugs into the serial port or parallel port of a computer – used to ensure that
only authorized users can copy or use a specific software application.
29
Martin Jansson, supra note 27.
30
Revenue Quebec encountered a similar problem in October 2002 when it began a large scale operation in
connection with a zapper investigation that involved twelve search warrants in Montreal and Brossard. These
parties were suspected of distributing a fraud-facilitating software that was developed in British Columbia. The
press release indicates:
C'est dans ce contexte que le Ministère a exécuté dans un premier temps, hier, un mandat de
perquisition à Vancouver concernant un groupe lié de quatre sociétés qui conçoivent un logiciel
utilisé dans la restauration. Elles sont soupçonnées d'avoir conçu un logiciel muni de la fonction
illicite en question et de l'avoir vendu à des distributeurs qui, à leur tour, l'ont vendu à des
restaurateurs. Précisons que le Ministère a obtenu la collaboration de l'Agence des Douanes et du
Revenu du Canada.
(It is within this context that the Ministry has implemented as a first step yesterday, a search
warrant in Vancouver on a related group of four companies that design software used in
restaurants. They are suspected of having developed a software bearing the illicit function [the
zapper] in question and have sold to distributors [in Quebec] who, in turn, have sold to restaurants
[in Quebec]. It should be noted that the Ministry has obtained the cooperation of the Agency of
Customs and Revenue Canada.)
Although it appears that the search in British Colombia did not uncover zapper software [the suspect
software performed normal bookkeeping functions] it is important to realize how much more difficult enforcement
becomes when the developer is in a different jurisdiction from the distributor and the operator. In this case Revenue
Quebec simply needed to work with the federal revenue authority to execute warrants. If this were a case where the
developer was in a foreign jurisdiction Revenue Quebec would need to ask for federal treaty assistance.
Revenue Quebec, Press Release, Zapper : Le ministère du Revenu perquisitionne au Québec et en ColombieBritannique (Zapper : The Ministry of Revenue conducts searches in Quebec and British Columbia) (in French only)
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Consider for example the following e-mail exchange between UK and Swedish auditors
about zappers. Agents from HMRC establishing a new anti-fraud audit group are asking their
counterparts in Sweden for names of ECRs where zappers have been found as well as whether or
not the zapper can be identified in a computer audit. The premise underlying this conversation is
that zappers travel easily across international borders. The Swedish auditor’s response
[necessarily edited for confidentiality purposes] is:
We have experience [with] several [types of] software but they are local.
[They are] produced [developed] in Sweden. [I] don´t think that you have heard of
{Zapper name omitted} or {Zapper name omitted} for example.
One [other] system is from Canada I think, {ECR operating system
omitted}, but we don´t know so much about it. Other systems are {ECR operating
system omitted} from {manufacture’s name omitted} and {ECR operating system
omitted} from {manufacture’s name omitted} but in these system we haven´t
revealed any fraud. In {Japanese manufacture’s name omitted} there is a system
with many names, one is {ECR operating system omitted} and [another] one is
{ECR operating system omitted} but it is the same. It is a Spanish program as it
seems and we have revealed a lot of fraud in this system and we also know how to
reveal it. The {Japanese manufacture’s name omitted} pc-system is installed in
the cash register {model number of a specific ECR} and {model number of a
different specific ECR} as I remember. I have heard that the Nederlands have a
system that they have investigated with success but I don´t know the name of it.
Perhaps that could be of interest for you. If you need I probably can provide a
contact in the Nederlands. But I think the {Japanese manufacture’s name
omitted}-system should be common in the UK.31
It is interesting to note how the Swedish tax official (speaking to a UK auditor) easily
goes from a discussion of:
- Swedish zappers (two specific kinds) to the
- Canadian ECR operating system that they work on, and then to
- Spanish zappers and the ECRs manufactured by a
available at : http://www.revenu.gouv.qc.ca/eng/ministere/centre_information/communiques/ev-fisc/2002/24oct.asp
(last visited Dec. 18, 2008).
Thus, consider the 2008 case of Logicaisse Computer Systems Ltd. This Quebec company is the exclusive
distributor of RMS-Touch software. RMS Touch software in turn is designed and developed by Adler
Microsystems Corp., dba RMS-TOUCH, a privately owned company, incorporated in 1986 in New Jersey. Adler is
a US company with headquarters located in Fort Lee, about a mile north of the George Washington Bridge.
If Revenue Quebec suspected that the zapper used with RMS Touch was developed at Adler Microsystems
and if it wanted to execute search warrants at Adler, it would be a far more complex undertaking than that involved
in the British Columbia case. It would involve first a discussion with Canadian federal authorities, who would then
enter into treaty discussions with US federal authorities, followed by further discussions with New Jersey
authorities. It is important to note that there is no public indication that this kind of four-way enforcement effort has
occurred in the Logicaisse case. It is the Canadian company (Logicaisse) not the American company (Adler) who is
suspected of developing the zapper. For Revenue Quebec’s description of the Logicaisse Ltd. investigation see
supra note 22 [Revenue Quebec, Press Release, Les systèmes informatiques Logicaisse ltée dans la mire de Revenu
Québec (Computer systems Ltd. Logicaisse in the grasp of Revenue Quebec) (Mar. 12, 2008) available at:
http://www.revenu.gouv.qc.ca/eng/ministere/centre_information/communiques/ev-fisc/2008/12mars.asp (last visited
Dec. 18, 2008).]
31
Personal e-mail communication, August 31, 2008 (on file with author).
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- Japanese company which they work on.
The assumption throughout is that some of these ECR systems should be found in the UK, and if
so, then so should the zappers that skim sales when they are installed on them.
SOLUTIONS – POLICY ORIENTATIONS
Globally, two policy orientations guide enforcement actions in this area – one approach is
rules-based; the other is principles-based.32 They are not mutually exclusive – degrees of
blending are common. Rules-based jurisdictions adopt comprehensive and mandatory legislation
regulating, and/ or certifying cash registers. Jurisdictions taking this approach include Greece
and Germany. These jurisdictions are classified generally as “fiscal till” or “fiscal memory”
jurisdictions.
Principles-based jurisdictions rely on compliant taxpayers following the rules.
Compliance is enforced with an enhanced audit regime. Comprehensive, multi-tax audits (the
simultaneous examination of income, consumption and employment returns) are performed by
teams that include computer audit specialists. Audits are frequently unannounced and preceded
by undercover investigations that collect data to be verified. Jurisdictions taking this approach
include the UK and the Netherlands. France has implemented a program of preventive audits
that target technology providers.33 A similar effort can be found in Quebec where the customer
lists of audited technology providers have been used to roadmap later audits of businesses
suspected of technology-assisted skimming.
Quebec is in transition between these policy orientations. Prior to January 28, 2008
Quebec was squarely with the group that preferred a principles-based approach. However, the
Quebec Minister of Revenue, Jean-Marc Fournier, announced34 that by late 2009 the MRQ will
begin testing the module d’enregistrement des vents (MEV).35 The MEV will be used only in the
restaurant sector. By 2010 or 2011 MEVs will be mandatory in all Quebec restaurants, where
they will assure accuracy and retention of business records within electronic cash registers
(ECRs).
Notably, the US does not have a coordinated zapper enforcement effort. It falls in neither
camp. In fact, the US has only uncovered two zappers, one at Stew Leonard’s Dairy in Norwalk
Connecticut where $17 million in federal tax liabilities accrued from the skimming of a far large

32

Fiscalis Committee Project Group 12, Cash Register Project Group, Cash Register Good Practice Guide, 5-6
(Dec. 2006) (unpublished report on file with author).
33
Id. at 6.
34
Revenue Quebec, Press Release, Jean-Marc Fornier, Pour plus d'équité dans la restauration : il faut que ça se
passe au-dessus de la table (For more equity in the restaurant sector it is required that [business is conducted] above
the table) (Jan. 28, 2008) available at :
http://www.revenu.gouv.qc.ca/eng/ministere/centre_information/communiques/autres/2008/28jan.asp (last visited
Dec. 18, 2008, translation on file with author).
35
Jean-Marc Fornier, L’évasion fiscale au Québec : Facturation obligatoire dans le secteur de la restauration –
Sous-déclaration des revenus dans le secteur de la restauration (Tax Evasion in Quebec : Obligatory Billing in the
Restaurant Sector – Under-declaration of revenues in the restaurant sector) 3 (January 28, 2008) (in French)
(powerpoint presentation and translation on file with author).
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amount of profits,36 and the other at the LaShish restaurant chain in Detroit Michigan where $20
million in cash sales were zapped and allegedly sent to Hezbollah in Lebanon.37 The zappers in
these cases were found almost by mistake. The Stew Leonard’s Dairy case came about when a
US Customs officer found more than $50,000 in cash in a suitcase carried by Mr. Leonard on
one of his frequent trips to St Martin.38 The La Shish case came about because the owners failed
to file a tax return. Roy Furchgott of the New York Times reported that, “[a]uthorities declined
to comment on how the reported crime was discovered, but according to court records, [the
owner] failed to file a tax return in 2003.”39
The US is particularly hampered in its approach to zappers – federal income tax audits
are not well coordinated with state and local retail sales tax audits. In addition, computer audit
specialists are not normally assigned to audits of small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs),
and this is where the zappers are.
Nevertheless, if any state in the US became serious about this problem it might find that
we might have a unique blend of rules and principles based solutions if we were to consider a
simple extension of the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement (SSUTA).40 Under the
SSUTA certified third party software providers (CSPs)41 could be tasked with assuring ECR
accuracy. Not only is the SSUTA legal framework operational, but at present levels of
technology a CSP could readily assure a state like California that the correct retail sales tax was
being collected and remitted, while it could also assure federal authorities that zappers were not
being used to underreport income. Certification of the CSP would need to be undertaken jointly
(by state and federal agencies) as would oversight of their operation. Quebec has not considered
a SSUTA/ CSP solution, but it might look at this option if it were to consider extending the MEV
outside the restaurant sector.
SOLUTIONS – PRESENT APPLICATIONS
The final section of this paper will consider the range of current solutions to automated
sales suppression software. Four approached will be described. The traditional fiscal till
solution (employed by Greece) will be contrasted with the traditional principles-based solution
(employed by the Netherlands). Because Germany will conclude the development of a smart
card in 2009 that will extend, simplify and substantially reduce the costs of a fiscal till solution it
will be considered next, along with a proposal to blend rules and principles based solutions in an
extension of the SSUTA.
36

U.S. v. Stewart J. Leonard Sr. & Frank H. Guthman, 37 F.3d 32 (1994), aff’d. 67 F.3d 460 (2nd Cir. 1995) (details
of the tax fraud are preserved in these appeals of the sentence).
37
Press Release, U.S. Dept of Justice, Eastern District of Michigan, LaShish Financial Manager Sentenced for 18
months for Tax Evasion (May 15, 2007) available at:
http://www.cybersafe.gov/tax/U.S.aopress/2007/txdv072007_5_15_ElAouar.pdf (last visited Feb. 3, 2008).
38
Leonard, 37 F.3d at 35.
39
Roy Furchgott, With Software, Till Tampering Is Hard To Find, NYT C6 (August 20, 2008).
40
Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement (adopted November 12, 2002, amended November 19, 2003 and
further amended November 16, 2004) § 203 (defining a CSP as “[a]n agent certified under the Agreement to
perform all the seller’s sales and use tax functions, other than the seller’s obligation to remit tax on its own
purchases.”) available at http://www.streamlinedsalestax.org.
41
Id., at § 203 (defining a CSP as “[a]n agent certified under the Agreement to perform all the seller’s sales and use
tax functions, other than the seller’s obligation to remit tax on its own purchases.”)
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GREECE:
FEDs; FECRs, AFED Printers; FESDs
Greece has had comprehensive, rules-based fiscal till legislation in place for over twenty
years. Technical specifications for Fiscal Electronic Devices (FEDs) were published widely in
2004.42 When considered as a whole, these rules attempt to provide complete data security
within an ECR.
Under Greek rules FEDs are divided into two categories: (a) fiscal electronic cash
registers (FECR) which are accompanied by autonomous fiscal electronic device printers (AFED
Printers), and (b) fiscal electronic signing devices (FESDs). The first are used only in B2C
transactions; the second may be used in B2C or B2B transaction. Both digitally sign tax-related
documents.
FECRs and AFED Printers. Fiscal electronic cash register (FECR) is a term that
includes ordinary stand-alone cash registers, and cash registers equipped with advanced
connection capabilities (network or PC operated machines). Autonomous fiscal electronic
device printers (AFED Printers) are fiscal printers that operate only via a connected computer.
They have no keyboard or display terminal. They do more than just print receipts however.
AFED Printers store and secure in their fiscal memory the data that has passed through them
(revenue from sales, and taxes collected).43
Data from the electronic journal memory is signed by a secure hash algorithm (SHA-1).44
This hash value is permanently safeguarded and stored in the fiscal memory. Daily sums
42

A European directive (98/34/EC) requires that whenever a Member State adopts new technical rules,
specifications, or legal requirements the Member State is obliged to announce this to the EU before the rules take
effect. According to this directive there is a minimal standstill period of three months. During this period any
Member State (or the European Commission) has the right to express a “detailed opinion.” The issue of a detailed
opinion extends the standstill period for another three months, and allows further consideration of the rules by all
parties. Greece made the technical specifications for FEDs public in 2004. As a result, the Greek rules are well
known not only within the EU but among the larger community of ECR manufacturers and distributors. They are
available in Greek as well as in official translations in three other languages, and can be accessed on the internet.
English: http://europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/tris/pisa/cfcontent.cfm?vFile=120040135EN.DOC
German: http://europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/tris/pisa/cfcontent.cfm?vFile=120040135DE.DOC
French: http://europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/tris/pisa/cfcontent.cfm?vFile=120040135FR.DOC
43
The FECR and AFED Printers must be equipped with either a 2-roll paper printing station, or a 1-roll paper slip
printer station as well as a daily Electronic Journal (EJ) memory. [EJ memory is different from fiscal memory. EJ
memory stores all information slips and tickets (“legal receipts”) from the issuance of the previous Z Report until
the issuance of the next Z Report. It is sometimes called the Temporary Daily Slip Storage Memory (TDSSM).
“Fiscal memory” on the other hand, is the basic secure element in the Greek system. It is based on a ROM – Read
Only Memory – chip that is securely placed within the fiscal cash register. Into this memory all important fiscal
data is stored.] EJ memory is either pluggable/unpluggable or fixed. It resides in the fiscal device and is always a
flash memory.
44
The Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA-1) was developed by the US National Institute of Standards and Technology.
SHA-1 is a widely accepted data encryption tool. It produces a 40-character string by hexadecimal symbols (20
bytes), and the string [or the “hash value”] uniquely defines the processed data [in the case of an ECR issuing
receipts in B2C transactions this data is the values on the printed receipt]. SHA-1 is described in detail in the
Federal Information Processing Standard 180-2 (August 1, 2002) available at:
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips180-2/fips180-2.pdf (last visited Aug. 8, 2008).
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(receipts and VAT amounts) are saved into the fiscal memory, cumulatively and on a daily basis.
This function essentially preserves the X and the Z Reports along with the Electronic Journal.
The cost of FECRs varies from € 200-250 to € 800-1,000 depending on the
manufacturer.45 Every manufacturer, developer, or importer of ECRs into Greece must seek
approval for each specific model that they intend to sell in the Greek market.46 A license to sell a
specific ECR is issued by a special technical (inter-party)47 body (committee) and will be issued
only when the ECR conforms to all statutory technical specifications.48 Applications are made to
the Department of Fiscal Electronic Cash Registers and Systems of the Ministry of Finance and
must be accompanied by a working model of the system for which a license is sought. The
committee has authority to examine any additional data (including experience in the field,
business solvency, creditworthiness, technical capacity of personnel), and has the authority to
recall and cancel licenses in cases where material changes have been made in systems or in the
conditions under which the license was granted.
Once a model has successfully passed all tests, the committee issues and gives to the
interested company a unique license number for the specific model. The license number is
recorded by the National Wide Information Center of the Ministry of Finance and is printed on
each receipt (“legal receipt”) issued in each retail transaction. In addition, this number is
required to be placed on a label that is visibly fixed to each machine. As a result, the
certification of a specific ECR can be checked both through a visual inspection of the machine
and by matching the license number on a machine with a given receipt.
FESDs. Under Greek rules a business owner can choose to use either a FECR (an
ordinary, inexpensive certified cash register), or a fiscal electronic signing device (FESD). If an
FESD is selected it probably means that the owner has capabilities, technology skills or a budget
allocation that would allow the use of a sophisticated computer system.
FESDs are designed for B2B applications. They are used primarily to e-sign invoices,
but can be used for any tax document including a final retail receipt. FESDs are connected to an
entrepreneur’s computer system via a dedicated port (RS-232; Ethernet RJ-45; USB). A driver
must be installed to allow the computer system to interface with the FESD. Essentially, the
FESD functions as a virtual printer allowing the entrepreneur’s back office software (ERP
system or accounting software package) to function normally. However, every tax document
required to be signed is diverted through the interface to the FESD where a signature is created
(the SHA-1 algorithm is applied) and a hash value is transmitted to (and printed on) each
45

Personal e-mail communication with Panos Zafiropolous (February 24, 2008) (on file with author).
There are roughly 300,000 to 350,000 FECRs and POS systems with secure recording devices (FESDs) in Greece.
The turnover of these devices is between 30,000 to 40,000 machines annually. There are over 300 different models
of ECRs certified for use in the Greek market representing approximately 50 different manufacturers, importers and
distributors. Cash Register Good Practice Guide, supra note 32, Appendix D, at ¶ 4.1.
47
An “inter-party” body under Greek rules is a committee where each member is assigned by one of the political
parties in the Greek parliament. Although the term of office is for two years, the composition of the committee will
change as political power shifts in Greek elections.
48
Technical specification change with advancing technology, and revisions to the law are made every two to four
years. Guidance on these matters comes primarily from specialized laboratories of National Technical University of
Athens (NTUA). The NTUA is also assigned by the committee to perform all the necessary evaluation tests to
carried samples of FCRs.
46
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document. The whole-day hash value is permanently saved in the FESD’s fiscal memory.49
This preserves all data on the document in detail.50
Presently the cost of an FESD is between € 450 and € 650. Thus, a FESD alone can cost
more than a FECR, and for this reason smaller businesses do not normally use FESDs to issue
legal receipts.51 Economies of scale also come into the picture because a single FESD can
support many cash registers linked on a network. It can be installed remotely (even in another
city), and need not be directly connected to the point of sale terminal.
An FESD owner is obligated to preserve signed documents and to store them on a safe
digital medium (optical or magnetic). Thus, auditors can check the integrity of these files by
running the same algorithm (SHA-1) and comparing the new hash value against the existing ones
secured within the FESD’s fiscal memory.
How FECRs with AFED Printers and FESDs defeat Zappers and Phantom-ware.
Because FECRs are certified for compliance with all technical specifications set out in Greek law
– a law that is supported and updated regularly by the research laboratories of the NTUA – it is a
very simple matter to determine if a specific ECR has been tampered with.
Factory-installed phantom-ware must be removed before certification. If a self-help
version of phantom-ware52 is on the ECR it will either be blocked or, or there will be a record of
the manipulation so that its impact on revenues will be neutralized. Only true data from real
transactions will be preserved and SHA-1 encrypted in the fiscal memory. Use of an add-on
zapper will be a violation of the licensing regulations. It will be detected in the same manner as
self-help phantom-ware. Severe penalties apply, but detection does require an audit.
Through the certification process the Ministry of Finance preserves a copy of all
approved firmware. It is a simple matter to calculate a checksum value (CRC-3253 or SHA-1)
for the object code of the firmware. Any auditor can then read the contents of the program
memory of a certified ECR and determine if changes have been made in the firmware (through
phantom-ware or zappers) by comparing his reading with that of the file kept in the Ministry of
Finance.
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From a hardware and a security perspective, there is very little difference between an AEFD Printer (with an
electronic journal) and a FESD.
50
Personal e-mail communication from Panos Zafiropoulos at item D (February 24, 2008) (on file with author).
51
In an effort to mitigate the cost of FESDs the tax law allows owners to depreciate FESDs as fixed assets over
three years. There is also a government loan program to assist in the purchase of all FEDs (FCRs; AEFD Printers;
FESDs). The interest on these loans is subsidized at 3%.
52
For a discussion of self-help phantom-ware see: Richard T. Ainsworth, Zappers and Phantomware: The Need for
Fraud Prevention Technology, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined..
53
CRC-32, or cycle redundancy check, takes as input a data stream of any length, and produces as output a value of
a certain space, commonly a 32-bit integer. The term CRC is often used to denote either the function or the
function's output. A CRC can be used as a checksum to detect alteration of data during transmission or storage.
CRCs are popular because they are simple to implement in binary hardware, are easy to analyze mathematically, and
are particularly good at detecting common errors caused by noise in transmission channels. The CRC was invented
by W. Wesley Peterson. W. Wesley Peterson & D. T. Brown, Cyclic Codes for Error Detection, 49 PROCEEDINGS
INST. RADIO ENGINEERS 228 (Jan. 1961).
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FESDs accomplish the same result as FECRs. Neither phantom-ware applications nor
zapper installations are effective when an FESD is installed. The FESD will sign each document
and preserve an encrypted trace in the fiscal memory of the device. Deletion or manipulation of
the records associated with cash receipts is no longer possible without detection.
Thus, if a Greek vendor produces a pro-forma receipt though an ECR the details of the
pro-forma receipt will be recorded in the Electronic Journal. If the ECR is a FECR this data
enters the Electronic Journal, and if the AFED Printer is set up to capture this data it will be
preserved in the fiscal memory and signed with a secure hash algorithm (SHA-1). Thus, it will
be possible to identify enterprises that routinely offered customers lower prices in exchange for
voiding the pro-forma invoice. This would not be possible with FESDs. FESDs are virtual
printers, and if data is not being sent to a printer an FESD would have no need to e-sign it.
Both of the Greek solutions are very effective enforcement measures. If a receipt is
printed both the FECR with an AFED Printer solution, as well as the FESD solution will assure
tax authorities that the tax collected on cash transactions have been recorded. It is important to
note however, that all of these efforts are directed only at accurate record retention. Returns
must still be prepared and filed, payments remitted for the taxes due or collected, and the revenue
authority still needs to audit to insure compliance. Admittedly, this audit should be easier, but it
is still needed.
THE NETHERLANDS:
COMPREHENSIVE TRADITIONAL AUDITS
The Netherlands is a principles-based jurisdiction, relying only on traditional audits to
detect sales suppression technology. Fiscal till jurisdictions, like Greece, also must rely on
audits, but not to the same extent and certainly not with the comprehensive scope as the Dutch.
Technology does not replace auditing; it only makes auditing easier. Thus, Quebec announced
an increase in the use of inspection teams in tandem with the announcement that MEVs would
soon be deployed. The MEV, which functions like a Greek FESD, is designed with an auditor’s
eye. It harmonizes data feeds from widely diverse ECRs, and translates encrypted signatures on
receipts into bar codes that can be scanned with hand-held optical readers.
The German assessment, also a fiscal till jurisdiction, is similar to that in Quebec.
Germany believes that fraud technology has advanced so far that success with traditional audits
is virtually impossible without a secure technological record. The German Federal Audit Office
(Bundesrechnungshof or BRH) indicated on November 24, 2003 to the Federal Ministry of
Finance that:
The latest generation of cash registers and cash register systems makes it
impossible for tax authorities to detect fraudulent declarations of cash receipts.
In these systems, data that have been entered, as well as system-generated
register and control data can be secretly tampered with. This leads to a high risk
of lost taxes that cannot be overestimated. This situation must change
immediately. …
The analysis reveals that auditors and tax investigators have constantly
discovered fraudulent manipulations of cash registers and the data they store.
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However, such manipulations could only be discovered in older generations of
electronic cash registers and cash register systems.
Verification of data has become extremely difficult since the introduction
of new cash registers and cash register systems….54
Brazil’s experience with ECR manipulation reinforces the German and Quebec
assessment. Reliance on technology – alone – to block manipulation is not sufficient. No matter
how much security is placed over digital records, an audit is always necessary. Brazil requires
that a “Black Box” be attached to each ECR. The device secures the electronic journal, and can
only be accessed by the tax administration. But as the 2008 criminal audit of all the
supermarkets in Belém, Operação Caixa 2 (Operation Second Register), demonstrates fraudsters
intent on skimming can find a way to get into the Black Box.55 Similarly in 2007 Operação
Tesouro (Operation Treasure-hunt) indicates that fraudsters have even been able to tamper with
the Black Box remotely. This operation, conducted in the State of Bahia, uncovered over threehundred food service establishments that used software to manipulate data before it was sent to
the Black Box.56
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BRH comments 2003, No 54, Federal Parliament circular 15/2020 at 197-198 (Nov. 24, 2003) (in German,
emphasis in original) (original and translation on file with author).
55
“Operação Caixa 2” (Operation Second Register) conducted by the Brazilian Federal Revenue service began on
October 1, 2007. In the early stages it involved 50 fiscal auditors, 20 tax analysts and 20 support personnel (police
units) operating in 10 teams in the city of Belém. On the first day of the operation five companies (supermarkets)
were raided, 175 recording machines were confiscated and 60 were found to have irregularities. In addition 17
suppliers were searched. By the second day 4 more supermarkets were raided in Capanema and 2 more in Bragança
were searched. “The fiscal auditor and coordinator of this activity, José Renato Gomes, affirms that yesterday’s
work is essential for finding out whether this kind of fraud is all coming from Belém, from the corporations
supplying the equipment, or if it is being set up and carried out outside the State.” Receita Federal fiscaliza
supermarcados em Belém (Federal Revenue Service investigates supermarkets in Belém); Receita Federal dá
prosseguimento à Operação Caixa 2 (Federal Reserve Gives the Go-ahead to Operation Caixa 2); Operação Caixa 2
divulga balance hoje (Operation “Caixa 2” to release results today) PLANTAO ONLINE EDITION (Oct. 1, 3 &18, 2007)
available at: http://www.orm.com.br/plantao/comentar.asp?id_noticia=290720 (in Portuguese – sequence of posting
on the Federal government web page) (translations on file with author).
56
Operação Tesouro (Operation Treasure-hunt) in the State of Bahia involved:
… seven businessmen from the bar and restaurant sector, as well as the owners of two information
sector businesses, namely Networks and Stella Systems, accused of being responsible for the
development of a tax evasion software program…. 28 search warrants … 35 teams … comprised
of 264 people, … the civil police, civilian and military police officers, tax auditors, revenue
agents, prosecuting attorneys and intelligence professionals … According to the technicians
involved … between 2005 and 2007 the fraudulent accountancy performed by the “Colibri”
[hummingbird] software program permitted the illegal withholding of almost R$2 million. The
number of establishments involved in the scheme may be as high as 300 in the food service sector
alone … these businessmen have been withholding nearly 40% of their companies’ turnover. …
the Colibri software, developed by Networks, is a database program for commercial automation,
commonly used by bars, restaurants and luncheonettes. The fraud consists in the use of the
program with a certain configuration permitting the deactivation of the Receipt Issuing Device
(ECF), and thus keeping the machine from issuing a receipt during payment for sales of products
or services.
?Thecnological fraud?..Bahia::Fraude:Sonegação Fiscal Leva sete Empresários para a Prisão Terça-feira,
(Technological Fraud? Bahia:: Fraud: Seven Businessmen Imprisoned for Illegal Withholding of Taxes) JOURNAL
DA MIDIA (Oct. 2, 2007) available at:
http://www.jornaldamidia.com.br/noticias/2007/10/02/Bahia/Sonegacao_fiscal_leva_sete_empres.shtml (in
Portuguese) (last visited Dec. 17, 2008) (translation on file with author).
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However, the Greek experience appears to stand in contrast to the Brazilian as well as in
contrast to the German and Quebec assessments. Even though regular audits of FECRs, AFED
Printers and FECDs are conducted by Greek authorities, no significant enforcement actions
involving ECRs have reached the courts, or can be referenced by tax officials.57 One might have
expected things to be different (in light of the twenty-year certification experience Greece has
with ECRs). It is not clear if this is a case of false-confidence in technology, or a case of
superior technology, but in light of the Brazilian investigations, the Greek approach needs to be
considered carefully.
The Netherlands is clearly at the other extreme. The Dutch are convinced that audits
(alone) are sufficient. They reject fiscal till technology. The fundamental emphasis in the
Netherlands is on detailed, comprehensive, and technologically penetrating audits. Direct
government intrusion into the recordkeeping systems of all businesses (encrypting the memory
of all ECRs and POS systems) just to catch a few fraudsters is avoided at all costs. Following a
pure principle-based approach to enforcement, the Netherlands feels it can rely on good business
practices and compliant tax payers.
However, Netherlands officials speak about performing “deep audits” – that is, audits that
are not focused just on the sales records in the ECR. A “deep audit” considers businesses
comprehensively – it looks at income taxes, consumption taxes and employment taxes
simultaneously and with heavy stress on the interrelationships among taxes. Ben B.G.A.M. van
der Zwet, lead auditor for technology compliance indicates:
The Dutch Tax Authority is convinced that the appropriate approach is to
use principle based laws in this area. This method involves maintaining the law
by stimulating the compliance of taxpayers. It is premised on a belief that we
should be working from a starting point of trust to get compliance, or to provide
explanations.
With respect to the problem of auditability and the completeness of sales
for enterprises with sizable over-the-counter payments, the Dutch Tax Authority
has decided to work to improve voluntary compliance.
The Dutch Tax Authority is cooperating with software developers,
suppliers and manufacturers of cash registers, branch organizations, and larger
companies.58
The Netherlands has been successful with this approach. One of the best examples of
how a comprehensive multi-tax audit can uncover data manipulations, and how this fraud is
derivative of the symbiotic relationship that develops between SMEs and their ECR providers
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The author has been in e-mail correspondence with Panos Zafiropoulos from the Greek revenue authority. Panos
responds to an inquiry about Greek legal cases on zapper enforcement actions by noting:
Because of the very strict and quite detailed technical specifications that exist in Greek legislation,
there are no infamous fraud cases regarding cash registers being used so far.
Personal e-mail communication (May 10, 2008) on file with author.
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Ben B.G.A.M. van der Zwet, Fiscal Obligations to Cash Registers in the Netherlands 8 (Draft 20080206)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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can be seen in the Grand Café Dudok case.59 A grand café is a style of café that occupies a
single large space welcoming a large amount of foot traffic and a large cash-based clientele, so it
is an ideal business for skimming.
Dudok skimmed cash receipts with a primitive zapper and used a portion of the cash to
pay employees under the table. The Belastingdienst (Dutch IRS) was suspicious of the low
wages reported, and thought that additional (unreported) compensation might be being
distributed (under the table).60 Testimony in the case indicated that on the second day of the
payroll audit the managing director of Straight Systems BV visited Dudok where he was
approached by the Dudok’s owner-manager. Straight Systems BV61 supplied the Finishing
Touch point-of-sale cash registers that were used by Dudok. The owner-manager explained that
he was having difficulty accounting to the Belastingdienst for the wages that were being
reported, in part because the auditors were also questioning the turnover that was reported. The
numbers did not “seem right” to the auditors, and they were requesting back-up data, something
that would lead them to the primitive zapper he was using.
The managing director of Straight Systems explained the existence of a more
sophisticated zapper, a “hidden delete” option already embedded in the Finishing Touch cash
registers. This was, “… a hidden menu option that, after enabling …, allowed operators of
catering establishments to delete cash register receipts from the system.”62 After this discussion
“… an employee of [Straight Systems] visited [Dudok] and explained [and enabled] the
application of the erase rule [or hidden delete function63], after which [Dudok] subsequently
decided to start using [it] …”64 Once more, Ben B.G.A.M. van der Zwet observes:
The most interesting thing about [Dudok] is that the discovery of the fraud
was completely the benefit of a good and thorough tax audit. Based on our
59

District Court of Rotterdam, LJN: AX6802 (Jun 2, 2006) available at:
http://zoeken.rechtspraak.nl/resultpage.aspx?snelzoeken=true&searchtype=ljn&ljn=AX6802 (in Dutch) (translation
on file with author); appealed to the District Court of The Hague where the judgment is upheld LJN: BC5500 (Feb.
29, 2008) available at: http://zoeken.rechtspraak.nl (in Dutch) (translation on file with author).
60
LJN: BC5500, at F3. Prior to using the phantom-ware installed on its system Dudok was skimming sales in a very
amateur fashion. The entire sales records of the POS system were deleted and records were reconstructed on x-cell
spreadsheets. The examining agents did not trust the spreadsheets and asked for the POS records as a back-up to
confirm what they were being shown on the audit. This in turn lead to the conversation with Straight Systems BV
where Dudok was informed that they already had phantom-ware that might solve this problem installed in their
system. Ben B.G.A.M. van der Zwet, (personal e-mail correspondence May 28, 2008) (on file with author).
61
Straight Systems BV is a Netherlands company that specializes in single-service ECR systems where all hardware
and software are developed “in house.” The company web site offers a 24-hour help desk where there is “… one
point of contact for all hardware and software for checkout’s front office and back office systems.” Available a t:
http://www.straight.nl (in Dutch, translation on file with author) (last visited May 24, 2008).
62
LJN: AX6802, at Consideration of the Evidence (Jun 2, 2006) (in Dutch) (translation on file with author). The
case discusses three software programs: Twenty/Twenty; Finishing Touch; Tickview.exe. Twenty/Twenty was a US
touch-screen program that did not have a phantom-ware application. Straight Systems BV added the phantom-ware
application to Twenty/Twenty and renamed the program Finishing Touch. Using just this program you can view the
sales ticket and change data. With a secret command the Tickview.exe program within Finishing Touch can be
activated and the operator is asked if they would like to delete the whole ticket. If an affirmative response is given
then the system records a “no sale” and the entire audit trail to the original data is eliminated. Ben B.G.A.M. van
der Zwet, (personal e-mail correspondence May 28, 2008) (on file with author).
63
The trial court in Rotterdam refers to the phantom-ware application as a “hidden delete function” whereas the
appeals court in The Hague refers to the phantom-ware as “the erase rule.”
64
LJN: BC5500, at F3.
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principle based law, tax officers were not satisfied getting the total reports and
MS excel work-pages with total sales etc. They wanted the detail information of
the POS. The tax officers persisted in their efforts to get the detailed information.
This forced the entrepreneur to ask the POS supplier to help him out. Because
[the entrepreneur] was aware that once the POS records were audited the fraud
would instantly be clear.
Straight Systems was helpful by installing an additional hidden feature of
the POS system. Records in the POS could [now] be deleted and the records
renumbered so that no gaps would appear.
A thorough investigation of the tampered databases revealed the deleting
of the records anyway. So this was not simple bad luck [for the taxpayer] but a
good audit job of the Tax administration!65
The court upheld criminal tax fraud determinations in the Dudok case under income,
value added, and payroll taxes. Both the restaurant operator and the ECR/ software provider
were convicted. Other successful audit-intensive cases in the Netherlands include:
• Microcraft Software which developed Analyse (aka, CX Analyse and Retail) as a
management information system for grocery stores, butchers and bakers. It
worked off a combination of ECRs and grocery scales. The zapper could be
started with a hidden combination of key strokes, and the user could then indicate
a percentage of turnover that would be skimmed.66
• B&F Software and Computers B.V. developed Beleids Informatie Systeem
(B.I.S.) for hairdressers and an add-on program for zapping cash sales through
POS and client information systems. After entering a percent to skim the system
selects customers to eliminate (for example male walk-ins without appointments
paying cash without special services).67
Thus, it is clear that an intensive and comprehensive audit approach works against
automated sales suppression devices. There are a number of sizeable cases in the Netherlands
and a much larger number of cases in Quebec that demonstrate the effectiveness of this
approach. Quebec however, unlike the Netherlands, feels that more than an audit is needed. The
MEV is a rules-based supplement to the audit effort.68
The UK shares the Netherland’s opinion,69 and would prefer to avoid universal fiscal till
solutions. However, this was prior to a recently completed National Pilot study of 941
enterprises where the first phantom-ware programs have been uncovered in the UK. Based on
the scope of this fraud (something that has not been fully analyzed as of this writing), the UK
may change its position.70
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Ben B.G.A.M. van der Zwet, (personal e-mail correspondence Apr. 16, 2008) (on file with author).
LJN: AT 5876, District Court of Arnhem (Jul. 27, 2005) (in Dutch) (translation on file with author).
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B&F Optics B.V. (District Court of Amsterdam (Aug. 11, 2005) (in Dutch) (translation on file with author).
68
The Quebec approach is to have the MEV together with specialized inspection teams, and a significant public
awareness program. Revenue Quebec, Tax Evasion in Quebec (powerpoint), supra note 35 at slide 5.
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See supra note32, Cash Register Good Practice Guide, 1.4.4 & Appendix E.
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Jennifer Mitchell, HMRC: Local Comp SME Interventions, personal e-mail communication (Nov. 26, 2008) (on
file with author).
66
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GERMANY
EMBEDDING SMART CARDS IN ECRs
The German Working Group on Cash Registers, comprised of the highest-tier central and
regional tax authorities, has been examining automated sales suppression (both phantom-ware
and zapper applications) in use in the country. An Interim Report has been released.71 The
problem is deemed to be serious, and a technological solution is entering the final stages of
testing.
The German solution involves encrypting critical data from the ECR on smart cards
securely embedded in ECRs. The German National Metrology Institute (PTB: PhysikalischTechnische Bundesanstalt) is the home of the INSIKA project (Integrierte Sicherheitslösung für
Kassensysteme – Integrated Security Solutions for Cash Registers). INSIKA began work on
prototypes of the solution in 2008.
Papers on encryption72 by Dr. Norbert Zisky of the PTB convinced the German Working
Group that encryption techniques had been sufficiently tested in secure communication settings
with measuring instruments73 that they could form the basis of a solution to zappers.
The INSIKA project was charged with completing the technical specifications for a
signature smart card by the summer of 2008.74 Included with the technical specifications for the
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Working Group on Cash Registers: Interim Report (Mar. 16, 2005) (Ger.) (on file with author).
Norbert Zisky, Manipulation Protection – Electronic Cash Registers and POS Systems, German Federal
Standards Laboratory, Brunswick & Berlin (May 2005) (unpublished draft on file with author); Norbert Zisky,
Manipulationsschutz elektronischer Registrierkassen und Kassensysteme German Federal Standards Laboratory,
Brunswick & Berlin (Mar. 15, 2004) (Ger.) (unpublished draft on file with author). Since this early paper there have
been a few modification to Professor Zisky’s proposal. The critical changes include:
1. The signature device (smart cards) distributed by the tax authorities will be personalized
to the tax payer not to the cash register (cash box);
2. The signature device will have a set of dedicated sum storages which will be controlled
by the signature device itself. It [will] generate the relevant data from the set of data to
be signed. In the [case where there may be] a loss of signed data the tax authorities [will
be] able to read the stored data from the smart card. The sum storages [are required] to
read out periodically and [are required] to be stored after signing.
3. The receipts [must] contain all relevant data for the verification of the transaction
(including the signature). These [receipts will be] exactly the same [as those] in the
memory (from the point of view of data modeling). With the help of [the memory
record] you are able to validate each receipt. Falsification of receipts [is] not possible.
But there is a little problem [currently]: If you have the paper receipt you [will need] to
type in every character into your computer by hand (or you may use a scanner). The
manual test of receipts without technical support will be the exception, but it [will be]
possible.
Norbert Zisky, personal e-mail communication (Feb. 15, 2008) (on file with author).
73
Luigi Lo Iacono, Christoph Rulans & Norbert Zisky, Secure Transfer of Measurement Data in Open Systems, 28
COMP. STANDARDS & INTERFACES 311 (Jan. 2006); SELMA Project http://www.selma-projekt.de (in German) (last
visited Feb. 12, 2008).
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At the time of this draft the INSIKA project appears to be on schedule, although the time line for publication of
the results have been pushed back from the summer of 2008 to the autumn, and now to the spring of 2009.
Professor Zisky indicates:
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signature smart card will be a determination of the data structures and formats, communication
protocols and security analysis for the system.75
Based on the recommendations of the Working Group, Vectron Systems AG developed
(and is currently demonstrating) a privately developed prototype of the German solution. Under
the Vectron prototype, every record holding of sales data (or any other activity performed on a
cash register) is secured through an encrypted hash total of the main data elements in the ECR.
A secure electronic signature is issued for this data based on Public Key Infrastructure (PKI).
The essence of the German solution revolves around cryptography and smart card access
to cryptographic data preserved within the cash register or POS system. If the revenue authority
audits it can access the records of the cash register with a “key” to read the data and determine if
there has been tampering. Dr. Zisky indicates:
The fiscally relevant data records can be examined both locally and after
their transmission over various communication channels, [processes will be] fully
automatic with respect to their integrity and authenticity. For the electronic
signature of the revenue office’s special smart cards are used, which are
integrated into the POS systems….
The revenue office will provide a smart card with a crypto processor for
each cash register. On these revenue office smart cards a cryptographic pair of
keys with a secret and public key is produced. The public key is kept for later
fiscal examination of the respective data. The certificate for the public key is also
stored on the smart card themselves….
In the case of the marking procedure [the encryption procedure] over the
data record – it is “signed” when a hash value is formed, which is in turn coded by
the secret key of the smart card. The formation of the hash value is a
mathematical one-way function, which comprises a single (unique) value from the
data set. It is the hash value that seals the data record (an electronic seal). The
formation of the signature is used to assign the data record to the cash (involved
in the transaction) and/ or the pair of keys. …
For the conclusion of the verification process the two hash values are
compared with one another. If these agree the integrity of the registered data
record is authenticated.76
The German solution is a fiscal till solution, but it is far more flexible and potentially
more comprehensive that either the Greek or the Quebec solutions. The German mandate is for
With our technical work we [have] made a lot of progress. Important parts of the
technical description are nearly finished. Th[ese] documents will be made available for the public
in [the] autumn. But the general technical concept will be published earlier.
In autumn the first ECRs will be equipped with the smart card.
Our cash register working group has finished the work on the internal, professional concept. This
concept contains all needed steps and structures to set up the smart card solution.
As I said one of the most important steps will be the set up of the public key
infrastructure. But the earliest date for the inevitable use will be January 1st 2012 or 2013.
Personal e-mail communication with Professor Zisky (July 10, 2008) (on file with author).
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Ben B.G.A.M. van der Zwet, Note: Draft 20080201 – Fiscal Obligations for Cash Registers in the Netherlands 10
(Feb. 1, 2008) (unpublished draft on file with author).
76
Norbert Zisky, Manipulation Protection, supra note 72, at ¶ 5.2 & 5.3.
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all ECRs and POS systems to be fitted with a smart card containing a crypto processor that esigns designated “tax-relevant data.” With this device the entire Electronic Journal could be
signed on a regular basis, or each transaction open or closed (sale, refund, training session,
voided sale, or temporary record) could be designated as a tax relevant and signed whenever
entered into the ECR. It would not matter under the German system if there was no receipt
(Greek and Quebec solutions are dependent on “legal receipts.”) It would only matter that each
item be registered in an ECR or POS system, and for that system to be fitted with a smart card.
The government could conduct audits remotely, because the German solution is fully
digital. A data feed could be taken directly from ECRs, or data could be transmitted through an
e-mail attachment. The Greek solutions cannot do this. The Quebec MEV does present ECR
data in a digital format, and could be used to facilitate remote audits on restaurants, but this
expansion of audit capability has been rejected by the MRQ on policy and privacy grounds.77
The Greek, Quebec and German solutions can also be distinguished based on “per unit”
cost of implementation. The German solution is far and away the least expensive. Both Greece
and Quebec have concerns over the high costs of their solutions. Under the Greek regime the
entire cost is born by business, although the government does provide tax breaks (accelerated
depreciation) and financial assistance (low interest loans) to assist with hardware purchases.
Quebec on the other hand plans to provide the MEV to businesses for free. The cost to the
government is expected to be $55 million.78 In this context, one of the key features of the
German solution is its low cost. Dr. Zisky indicates:
In … this [German] approach … for the protection of electronic cash registers and
POS systems against the manipulation of stored data [t]he large advantage …
consists of the reaching of a comparatively high level of protection with only
small hardware and software expenditures in the POS system being necessary.79
Dr. Zisky estimates an overall cost of 50 euro for the German smart card solution,
itemized it as follows:
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Dave Bergeron, personal e-mail communication on the rejection of remote audits performed by linking to
taxpayer’s MEV (Nov. 20, 2008) (on file with author). It is questionable whether or not the MRQ is dealing with a
real privacy concern here, or merely the appearance of an intrusion on a protected privacy interest. There should be
little that should be considered confidential in the bulk transmission of itemized business records setting out daily
sales of goods or services, provided those sales are not further associated with an individual – an unsuspecting
customer. It is the retention of a customer’s personally identifiable information (PII) in business records that is a
privacy concern. If not handled properly this may lead to an unpermitted government intrusions into private lives.
See: Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy’s Other Path: Recovering the Law of Confidentiality, 96
GEORGE. L. J. 123 (2007) (discussing the origins and different development paths of privacy law in the US and UK
– the US with and individualistic understanding and the UK with a relational understanding – and indicating that
unpermitted disclosure of PII within business records is central to both). Nevertheless, it is common in the
transaction tax context to put protections in place whenever third-party access to tax data is contemplated. For
example, section 321 under the Streamlined Sales Tax restricts retention of PII by CSPs performing tax calculations.
Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement (adopted November 12, 2002, amended November 19, 2003 and further
amended November 16, 2004) available at http://www.streamlinedsalestax.org (last visited Feb. 3, 2008).
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Caroline Rodgers, Québec va de l’avant pour stopper la fraude fiscale, HOTELS, RESTAURANTS & INSTITUTIONS
(Feb. 12, 2008) available at : http://www.hrimag.com/spip.php?article2771 (in French only, translations with
author).
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Norbert Zisky, Manipulation Protection, supra note 72, at ¶ 5.1.
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The additional costs per ECR are the result of cost for the smart card
(signature device), approx. 7-8 Euros, and for integration of the smart card to
ECR, approx. 20 Euros (including hardware and software). [An] additional 20
Euros I calculate [are needed] for additional common costs (smart card
distribution, administrative costs). Government subsid[ies] are not planned. But
on the hand of tax authorities some expenditure is needed. Certificate
management, test tools, training of the staff of tax authorities [need to be included
in a full cost estimate].
The price of smart cards is calculated on the base of more than 100,000
cards because they will be ordered by a central authority.80
In fact, Vectron’s prototype of the INSIKA smart card solution has an even lower cost estimate.
Vectron estimates a “single-unit end-user price of less than 25 euros.”81
BLENDING RULES & PRINCIPLES:
CERTIFICATION OF THIRD PARTY SERVICE PROVIDERS
Certification is the common thread among all zapper enforcement efforts. This is
apparent if we step back from the details. In each instance – the Greek, Quebec, German and
Dutch – tax authorities responded to the threat of automated sales suppression in the same
manner – they all looked for certification of digital records. Rules-based jurisdictions imposed
external certification regimes to force businesses to keep trustworthy records; principles-based
jurisdictions induced businesses to develop their own internal (self) certification regime. In all
cases however, it is the reliability of digital records that is the main concern – and in all cases the
question is whether the certification is trusted. Both approaches work. But neither approach
(rules-based nor principles-based) comes without problems.
In the instance of rules-based jurisdictions the prospect of forcing all businesses to accept
a government presence inside the recordkeeping function of private enterprises – the fiscal till
solution – is considered (by some) to be far too intrusive. The observation is that this remedy is
overly broad, and needs to be more focused. Why should all sales activity be certified through
government oversight, just because some records are untrustworthy? In Quebec the
government’s MEV minicomputer must be placed between every ECR and printer in every
restaurant. In Germany every ECR will be required to install a tamper-resistant, governmentissued smart card that can be configured to record, encrypt and transmit everything that occurs
within the ECR. In Greece no business can be conducted without processing transactions
through a government certified ECR or FESD.
Principles-based jurisdictions are much more “hands-off” initially. Moral factors and
good business practices are relied upon to make digital records trustworthy. Unfortunately, this
solution requires oversight, and the oversight that works is an audit program that is both
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comprehensive and technologically-intensive. Even though it is more than unpleasant for a small
business to respond to these kinds of audits, the real problem is not the complaints of the
business owners it is the fiscal demands placed on the revenue authority that must conduct the
audit. Funding is rarely sufficient to secure the necessary audit teams and computer audit
specialists.
Fortunately, there is another option – certification of intermediaries. This approach uses
certified service providers (CSPs). CSPs are well known under the Streamlined Sales and Use
Tax Agreement (SSUTA), and can be a useful tool for jurisdictions, like California, that seek to
develop less intrusive and less expensive methods for combating automated sales suppression.
Currently SSUTA CSPs perform all consumption tax compliance functions for their clients.
They determine taxability and the correct rates. They prepare and file returns, make tax
payments, and immunize the taxpayer from liability for errors (except taxpayer fraud).
Extending traditional CSP obligations to include certification by the CSP to the
government that the taxpayer’s ECRs and POS systems are free from zappers and phantom-ware
would create a new enforcement regime. Four questions need to be addressed: (1) how would a
CSP get ECR and POS system data; (2) how would a CSP know the data it has is accurate; (3)
what standards should the government use to certify a CSP’s automated system – (in other
words) what data does a tax authority want to be sure that a CSPs automated system captures so
that it can trust the CSPs attestation of the accuracy of the taxpayer’s system; and (4) what is the
most efficient and cost effective way for a CSP to satisfy this standard?
(1) How would a CSP get ECR and POS system data?
CSPs currently pull data directly from the ECR or POS system when they are used to
determine taxability. This data is stored in an independent (tamper-proof) audit file, and is used
by taxpayer to draft the invoice (receipt). The CSP maintains this file to protect itself from
liability.
(2) How would a CSP know that the data it has is accurate (free from manipulation)?
This is a key question. The most effective way to do this is to adopt the German smart
card in the private sector. The German smart card can be configured to sign every event –
completed sales, temporary records, refunds, test modes, open or partially completed
transactions. Every key stroke can be recorded, collected and encrypted on the smart card, and
then transmitted to the CSP.82 Questions about any transaction, or the business records
associated with any ECR could then be directed to the CSP. Only in cases of fraud would it be
necessary for the tax administration to approach the taxpayer. If suspicions were raised it would
be in the self-interest of the CSP to assist the government in determining the truth.
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This would be a form of comprehensive ECR monitoring,83 but it is the private sector
monitoring the private sector, not an intrusive government oversight program.
(3) What standards should the government use to certify a CSP’s automated system – (in
other words) what data does a tax authority want to be sure that a CSPs system
captures so that it can trust the CSPs attestation of the accuracy of the taxpayer’s
system?
The data preservation standards that a CSP would need to meet if it were to certify the
accuracy of business records in an ECR should be the same standards that a principles-based
jurisdiction, like the Dutch, would set down for all ECRs. In Your Cash Register and the Fiscal
Accounting Obligations,84 the Dutch Tax Authority lists the requirements for a business wishing
to bring their ECRs or POS system into compliance with Dutch law. They include:
• Detailed records available for the tax auditor if and when required.
• Electronic preservation of the details of transactions.
• Preservation of a complete audit trail.
• Taking adequate measures to guard against subsequent alterations in a manner that
will assure that data-integrity is maintained.
The Dutch requirements may not be difficult for larger businesses, but for SMEs (which
is where phantom-ware and zappers are found) the requirements are burdensome. Ben B.G.A.M.
van der Zwet confirms:
Hardly any of the cash registers or Point of Sale systems by themselves
complies with the requirements set out by the Dutch Tax Authority. With larger
companies this omission can be compensated for with adequate internal control
measures. Without similar internal control efforts, SMEs that may be willing to
comply with Dutch fiscal obligations will fail in their attempts.
• Data needs to be stored electronically.
• Facilities have to be implemented to export data to digital data carriers.
• Settings of the software and the adequate database structures must support
a proper audit trail.
• Measures must be taken to assure the reliability of retained data.
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Under the SSUTA model a service provider would not be certified unless it could assure tax
authorities that its system accurately, completely, and automatically captured this data from the
taxpayer’s ECRs. With this data on hand the CSPs attestations would be highly credible.
(4) What is the most efficient and cost effective way for a CSP to satisfy this standard?
The smart card is the primer solution. It is far less expensive and captures far more data
than any other option. The smart card is proven technology, and the CSP in a SSUTA context is
a proven legal structure. Merging them in a CSP/ smart card solution makes a great deal of
sense.
The only competing option is for the government to do it directly. However, even the
German research teams working on the smart card project concede that direct government
involvement compromises the effectiveness of the solution.
The German smart card solution comes from successful research in legal metrology,
specifically the SELMA (Secure Electronic Measurement Data Exchange) project. The
immediate goal SELMA was to “…ensure the secure transfer of measured energy data from
decentralized meters to the authorized users via open networks.”85 SELMA succeeded. The
project leaders summarized SELMA as follows:
SELMA … developed a security architecture to establish trust in the
electronic transfer of data from the meter to data acquisition systems and further
to the customers. The introduced security mechanisms are based on asymmetric
cryptography and more specifically on digital signatures that enable the signed
measurement data to be verified and authenticated in conjunction with a suitable
key management. Particular security units have been created that contain the
necessary security mechanisms.
The SELMA architecture represents a best practice solution of strong
cryptographic mechanisms to secure a wide range of metrology applications and
is compatible with appropriate European directives and guidelines.86
SELMA looked at natural gas meters. The SELMA solution assured multiple parties
(traders, distributors, owners of distribution networks, and consumers) that remotely monitored
meters were accurate. Based on an assumption that ECRs and POS systems were nothing more
than a different kind of meter recording a different kind of data flow, the SELMA researchers
suggested that the same solution could apply in this new context as well. As a result, a new
project, INSIKA (Integrierte Sicherheitslösung für Kassensysteme – Integrated Security
Solutions for Cash Registers) was opened in 2008 to consider this application.
There are two critical differences between SELMA and INSIKA: (1) the INSIKA data
represents confidential tax information (not natural gas measures), and (2) the group of interested
parties includes the government (whereas only private parties are involved in gas metering). The
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researchers soon became aware that there was “…strong resistance against this online tracking of
transactions [by the government].”87 As a result the SELMA solution was not able to be fully
implemented in INSIKA. Dr. Zisky noted:
The realtime, central collection of very large amounts of data is already
being carried out today in different sectors of the economy. One example worth
mentioning is the area of special contract customers for power supply. Of
approximately 300,000 special contract customers, energy amounts recorded in
intervals of 15 minutes are read out daily and stored centrally. These data,
relevant to calibration law, provide the basis for the monthly billing. For the sake
of completeness, the following should also be mentioned: work is currently being
done towards securing measurement data cryptographically.
The decisive difference between the example of energy data transfer and
the realtime, central recording of tax-relevant data consists in the fact that the
data must be collected by the authorities, rather than by a contracting partner.88
Simply put, even when there is “nothing to hide” there are real privacy concerns when the
government gets too intrusive.89
These are the same issues that confronted SSUTA. The real-time collection of tax data
by the government was not acceptable to business, but it was acceptable when a third party did it.
Thus, the issue changed. Now the question was whether or not the government could trust the
third party as much as the taxpayer did, not whether or not the government should be trusted to
collect the data directly. The SSUTA answer was “yes,” the government could trust the third
party, but only if the third party’s systems were certified.90
SSUTA was born as an inexpensive, voluntary regime to streamlines sales tax
compliance. It extends audit immunity to taxpayers who used CSPs, because the CSP is trusted
by the government. A SSUTA-like system to prevent zappers and phantom-ware applications in
ECRs could be made mandatory for all sectors of an economy or it could be applied only in high
risk sectors or maybe it could be made mandatory only for those taxpayers who had previously
been found to manipulate sales records. Even though mandatory for some the CSP option should
remain open for all businesses. This would increase the pressure on those who do not use CSPs
to maintain good records, and traditional audit resources could be more intensively focused on
this subset.
CONCLUSION
Automated sales suppression is a global problem, and it will only grow in significance
with the 21st century economy. The task in front of this Commission is not easy. It is difficult to
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craft a stabilizing, revenue neutral tax reform that will modernize, provide jobs and growth but
not raise taxes.
However, if there are significant drains on revenue from skimming cash sales, then not
only are sales taxes that have been paid by the customer not being remitted to the government,
but business income taxes are being under-reported, and most likely cash wages are being paid
under the table (and also not reported). Solutions to this problem run from very expensive fiscal
till regimes to intensive commitments of specialized audit resources. This is not an area where
state and local tax enforcement can piggybacking on a federal audit. Stew Leonard’s Dairy and
the La Shish Restaurants are the only federal zapper audits, and neither of these were performed
west of the Mississippi.
Fortunately there is a very cost-effective remedy in the CSP option. California has not
joined SSUTA, but that does not prevent it from taking an arrow for the SSUTA quiver and
directing it at this problem. But those steps will come later. At the moment California needs an
empirically valid study of the automated sales suppression within the State, and the Commission
on the 21st Century Economy should recommend that be undertaken. If the California study
returns results like Quebec’s and Germany’s, then one would expect to see somewhere in the
neighborhood of 50% of all ECRs infected with zappers or phantomware, and that revenue losses
range somewhere in the neighborhood of 16% (sales tax, business income tax, payroll taxes and
personal income taxes combined).
If results like this seem reasonably likely to the Commission, then it might also
recommend that policy level decisions be made now on how to deal with this threat to State
revenue – a rules-based fiscal till, principles-based comprehensive audits, or an extended
SSUTA-like CSP approach.
In the meantime California might consider reading some foreign newspapers and begin to
ask questions when a business with California operations is found to be using zappers to skim
cash sales in a foreign jurisdiction. Zappers follow the commercial path cut by ECRs. They do
not respect judicial boundaries. For example, when Celine Dion’s Nickel restaurant chain was
raided by Revenue Quebec, and each of the 32 Nickel restaurants in the Province were found
using zappers, the zapper question should have arisen in the mind of the Florida Department of
Revenue where there were 2 more Nickel restaurants. It certainly did in the mind of the Ontario
authorities where the remaining 10 Nickel restaurants were located.91
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